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Over the past 30 years, international instruments have emerged across a number of legal 
regimes that impose on States binding and non-binding obligations relating to children in 
conflict with the law (Hespel, Put and Rom, 2012).  The rights-based standards contained in 
these measures cover all elements of youth justice from prevention to detention.  Using England 
as an example, this chapter examines the utility and futility of international standards in 
affecting change in domestic youth justice systems and in providing legally enforceable 
remedies.  I focus on two legal regimes: the United Nations (‘UN’) and the Council of Europe 
(‘CoE’).i  Considered individually, neither system provides the perfect vehicle for securing the 
rights of children in conflict with the law.  The UN has detailed, comprehensive and child-
specific standards but an historically weak method of enforcement; the CoE has the European 
Court of Human Rights to which individuals can bring complaints for breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but this is a general rights treaty the substantive content 
of which is not tailored to children’s interests.ii   Both regimes have, however, recently sought 
to address their respective weaknesses: at the UN level, a system of individual complaint was 
adopted in 2014 (the Third Optional Protocol: ‘OP3’); and in 2010, the CoE published child-
friendly justice guidelines.  This chapter considers both of these developments but the primary 
focus is on what Kilkelly (2001) has described as the ‘best of both worlds’: the use of UN 
standards to interpret the ECHR in order to secure legally enforceable children’s rights. 
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THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE 
LAW 
The most comprehensive source of international standards for children, both generally and for 
those in conflict with the law, is the UN and in particular the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC).  The CRC was not the first international children’s rights instrument but its 
emergence marked an important conceptual shift in the image of the child from object of 
concern to legal subject (Verhellen, 1992).  Accordingly, the Convention includes many 
autonomy-based rights (including civil and political rights and rights of participation) as well 
as interests deriving from children’s physical, developmental, economic, and legal 
dependencies: thus helping to ‘mediate the tensions’ (Cipriani, 2009) between the justice and 
welfare models of youth justice.  Of the CRC’s 54 Articles, two have specific relevance to 
children in conflict with the law.  Article 37 prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
and punishment, specifically proscribing the death penalty and life imprisonment without 
parole. It also includes the child-specific requirement that detention should be used only as a 
last resort and for the shortest possible time.  Article 40 sets out many of the procedural rights 
for minors.  These go beyond the usual fair trial rights to also include the desirability of 
reintegration, diversion and non-custodial responses; the requirement to set a minimum age of 
criminal responsibility (MACR); protection of privacy; and the child’s right to be supported by 
her parents and by legal or other assistance.  All of the other substantive rights – for example 
to education, access to health care, parental contact - extend to (putative) child offenders but 
apart from the four general principles (best interests, the right to be heard, non-discrimination, 
and the right to life, survival and development) their utility remains largely under-explored in 




The breadth of the CRC’s content, together with its jurisdictional reach (all UN members 
except the USA have ratified or are in the process of ratification), underlie its strengths and its 
weaknesses: securing almost universal agreement from vastly different States for a legally-
binding treaty that contains over 40 substantive provisions meant that, in order to be politically 
feasible, the rights were widely drafted (sometimes vague) and the enforcement mechanisms 
weak (Kilkelly, 1996: 117).  However, neither of these shortcomings necessarily limits the 
Convention’s utility.  First, the CRC is supplemented by a range of ambitious, comprehensive, 
and detailed (non-binding) soft law measures that raise standards through their persuasive 
force, their use in advocacy and campaigning, and by aiding the interpretation of the 
Convention and other legally-binding instruments (see below).  These include, in the context 
of juvenile justice, the Beijing Rules, the Havana Rules, and the Riyadh Guidelines and 
secondary sources that derive from the jurisprudence of the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (hereafter, UN Committee).iii   Soft law fleshes out the Convention, providing detailed 
requirements such as a MACR over the age of 12 (UN Committee, 2007: para 32) and consent 
prior to the use of diversion (Beijing Rules, 1985: rule 11.3).  Second, enforcement of the CRC 
has been strengthened by two developments: the adoption of OP3 and the Convention’s use as 
an aid to interpretation by domestic and regional courts.  Initially, monitoring and enforcement 
of the CRC was limited to a five-yearly periodic reporting process, overseen by the UN 
Committee.  The concluding observations of the Committee that follow each report contain 
non-binding recommendations, compliance with which depends on diplomacy and political 
pressure rather than legal sanction (Kilkelly, 1996, 2001; Woll, 2000).  Through this process 
the UK has been criticised (in relation to England) for its MACR, high custody figures 
(especially remand), the use of adult courts, inadequate protection of privacy, and conditions 
in detention.  Subsequent reforms to law, policy and practice have addressed some of the 
Committee’s recommendations (HM Government, 2014) but compliance has been piecemeal.  
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On issues about which the Government is resolute, or which would be politically unpopular – 
for example the MACR or anti-social behaviour measures - the monitoring process can appear 
futile.  Further, even where the Government has reported progress on its compliance with 
previous recommendations, this has usually been partial (thus appearing tokenisticiv) and/or 
attributable to other factors.v  Nonetheless, although non-binding, concluding observations play 
an important role within domestic political accountability processes (House of Lords House of 
Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2014) and – as the UN Committee’s 
jurisprudence - provide the definitive interpretation of the CRC (Hespel, Put and Rom, 2012).  
Though infrequent, there are examples of the English courts giving indirect legal effect to 
concluding observations with which the Government had previously failed to comply.vi  
However, the ability of the courts to do so is highly circumscribed (see below).    
 
As noted above, the CRC’s enforcement mechanisms have been strengthened by the adoption 
in 2012 of OP3.   The Protocol brings the CRC into line with all the other UN human rights 
treaties by (inter alia) introducing a system of individual complaints for alleged infringements 
of children’s rights.  Buck and Wabwile (2013) suggest that OP3 has two key benefits.  First, 
it fills an institutional gap by providing a child-specific complaints mechanism which 
represents ‘an emblem of relevant values, norms and principles that prompts awareness of 
children’s rights’ that can ‘drive states to review and reform their domestic human rights 
policies and practices’ (Buck and Wabwile, 2013: 226).  Second, it reduces the knowledge gap 
by providing a concrete and context-specific arena for the development of the UN Committee’s 
jurisprudence.  However, OP3 has been criticised for failing to include a collective complaints 
process (Grover, 2015) and for being insufficiently ‘child-friendly’, with little to differentiate 
it from the complaints processes of other human rights treaties (Egan, 2014).  Furthermore, 
complaints can only be made against States that have ratified the Protocol itself (Article 1(3)).  
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The UK has not ratified and is unlikely to do so soon (House of Lords House of Commons 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2014: para 35). Therefore, for children in England and 
Wales the utility of OP3 is indirect only, via its contribution to the Committee’s jurisprudence 
(which domestic and intra-national courts may draw on).  
CHILD FRIENDLY JUSTICE IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE  
In 2012, the Council of Europe published its Strategy for the Rights of the Child, designed to 
achieve ‘effective implementation of existing children’s rights standards (Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, 2012).  As part of the predecessor programme to the 
Strategy (Building a Europe for and with Children programme) the Guidelines on Child 
Friendly Justice were produced (Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 2010: 
hereafter ‘Guidelines’).  The Guidelines do not create new standards; rather they collate 
international rights to provide practical guidance for member states to design their judicial and 
non-judicial systems in a child-specific way.  The Guidelines emphasise general norms 
including dignity and the rule of law (due process, presumption of innocence, legality, 
proportionality, the right to a fair trial and so on), and child-specific principles drawn from the 
CRC (participation, best interests and non-discrimination).  The more specific standards 
broadly replicate UN measures; however, the involvement of children and young people in the 
drafting process led to greater emphasis on confidentiality, the importance of support from 
family and friends, the provision of feedback on decisions, the right to gain access to 
independent support and complaint mechanisms, and the right to be informed and heard 
(Kilkelly, 2010a: 40).  As a non-binding instrument, the effectiveness of the Guidelines 
depends on political commitment, professional awareness, and their value as a judicial 
interpretative tool.  The European Union has committed to taking the guidelines into account 
in future legal instruments, but lack of awareness amongst professionals in the UK (judges, 
6 
 
police, lawyers, and social workers) diminishes their utility (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 2015).  Thus, along with other European soft law (including Council of 
Ministers recommendationsvii) and UN standards, the guidelines might prove most useful if 
they can acquire indirect legal effect through the ECHR; however, this has not happened in any 
significant way to date. 
GIVING (INDIRECT) LEGAL EFFECT TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: THE 
ECHR AND THE COURTS 
Even without direct incorporation into domestic law, international standards can be used in 
litigation to secure immediate advances in children’s rights by providing the basis for legally-
binding remedies for individual or groups of children and, when used strategically, systemic 
change (Kilkelly, 2010b: 247).  For children in England, it is the ECHR, enforced by the ECtHR 
and given domestic legal effect by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), that has provided the 
primary vehicle for the development of child-specific rights informed by other, non-
enforceable measures.  This is possible, says Kilkelly (2001: 313) because the ECHR is broadly 
drafted (which allows for imaginative interpretation) and because it is a ‘living instrument . . . 
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’ (Tyrer v UK), which for 
children includes taking account of developing international standards.  In the field of juvenile 
justice, it is standards deriving from the CRC that have been most influential, primarily because 
of its specificity and the consensus indicated by its almost universal ratification (Forowitz, 
2010).  This has led Kilkelly to suggest this is the ‘best of both worlds’, combining ‘the child-
specific provisions of the CRC with the ECHR’s effective system of individual petition in order 
to maximise the potential of both instruments to advance children’s rights’ (Kilkelly, 2015).   
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The European Court of Human Rights 
The ECtHR has considered complaints relating to various aspects of the youth justice system 
in England: the MACR (V v United Kingdom); trial procedures in the Crown Court (V v United 
Kingdom and SC v United Kingdom); sentencing (Hussain v United Kingdom; V v United 
Kingdom; Bailey v United Kingdom); procedural protections for out of court disposals (R v 
United Kingdom); retention of DNA samples and fingerprints following acquittal (S and 
Marper v United Kingdom); and the placement of vulnerable children in young offender 
institutions (Bailey v United Kingdom).  In most, though not all of these cases, the Court drew 
on UN standards.  The applicant children were at least partially successful in four of the 
decisions (Hussain, V, SC and Sviii) and legal and policy changes have subsequently been made 
to the sentence of detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure (to allow periodic review and to 
remove the power of the Secretary of State to set the tariff period); to Crown Court procedures 
in order to secure effective participation and limit the child’s intimidation, humiliation, or 
distress (see Practice Direction 2/11); and to the retention of DNA of child suspects (see 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012).   
However, the ECtHR is not a de facto CRC court.  It has its own political, jurisdictional and 
operational boundaries which limit its capacity to give effect to other international norms: its 
authority and legitimacy– and thus the likelihood of Member States complying with its 
pronouncements – depends on it remaining within those boundaries (McInerney-Lankford, 
2012).   Therefore, although children’s rights is an area where the ECtHR has been receptive 
to international law (Forowicz, 2010), the Court nonetheless operates under a number of 
constraints.  
The first constraint relates to the ECHR’s substantive content: the ECtHR ‘will not stretch an 
existing European Convention right to meet the global standard if it means creating a new right' 
(van Bueren, 2007: 19).  In R v United Kingdom, for example, the ECtHR held that Article 6 
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did not apply to pre-charge diversion when a 14 year-old boy received a final warning (caution) 
for a sexual offence, which had resulted in his placement on the sex offender’s register.  
Without Article 6 there was no vehicle for the boy to argue that his consent to the warning was 
required, as per the Beijing Rules (Hollingsworth, 2007).  
The second limitation relates to the Court’s role within the constitutional structure of the CoE, 
and its need to balance the development of common standards with the legitimate diversity that 
exists across Member States in how to protect those rights.  The ECtHR has adopted the ‘margin 
of appreciation’ doctrine as the means of deferring to States in circumstances where they have 
special knowledge, particularly when there is no European consensus on the issue.   McInerney-
Lankford has noted that the doctrine ‘operates indirectly to restrict the Court’s freedom to 
consider other sources of international law, by restricting the Court from moving beyond the 
consensus binding Contracting States or exceeding its jurisdictional mandate’ (2012: 613). The 
setting of a MACR is one area where there is little consensus and in some countries – the UK 
included – it is highly politicised.  Unsurprisingly then, in V v United Kingdom the ECtHR 
rejected the Article 3 claim that holding criminally to account for murder two boys aged 10 
constituted degrading and inhuman treatment.  At the time, the relevant international norm 
required only that a MACR be set (Article 40(3)(a) CRC), and that it not be too low, bearing 
in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity (Beijing Rule 4.1); and, 
although the UN Committee had earlier recommended that the MACR in England be raised, it 
had not specified to what age (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 1995).  Since this 
decision, the UN Committee has stated that a MACR below the age of 12 is internationally 
unacceptable (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2007).  However, given that the more 
recent, more geographically-specific, child friendly justice guidelinesix replicate the vaguer 
Beijing Rules, the ECtHR is unlikely to regard the UN Committee’s statement as the most 
authoritative indication of European consensus (Hespel, Rom and Put, 2012: 353).  This points 
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to a larger problem with the proliferation of international norms for juvenile justice emerging 
from different legal regimes: they can ‘overlap, place different emphasis on different aspects 
and, at worst, contradict each other’ (Hespel, Rom and Put, 2012: 337).  Although ‘non-
regression’ (or ‘savings’) clauses are included in most rights instruments (that is, that where 
higher standards exist in international or domestic law they should apply), the fragmentation 
of international law (Koskenniemi and Leino, 2002) can result in ‘textual variation, or even 
inconsistency, [which] weakens the authority of all and creates incoherence' (Chinkin, 2003: 
28).  The child friendly justice guidelines may therefore stymie (eg with regards to the MACR 
or privacyx), as well as improvexi, the development by the ECtHR of children’s rights in 
juvenile justice.  
The final point to make here is that where children in conflict with the law in England have 
been successful in their claims before the ECtHR, the Government’s response has been just 
sufficient to comply with the Court’s decision (thus acquiring legitimacy for those actions) but 
falls short of full compliance with international standards.  This is perhaps most obvious in 
relation to the remedial action taken after S v United Kingdom where, in response to the finding 
that the blanket retention of suspected/offenders’ DNA is unlawful, the Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012 nonetheless still allows the DNA of children convicted of more than one minor 
offence to be kept indefinitely (House of Lords House of Commons Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, 2011: para 61ff).  The UN Committee also continues to criticise the use of adult Crown 
Courts for children despite the practice direction introduced following V v United Kingdom 
which attempted to make them more child-friendly.  We might, therefore, agree with van 
Bueren that it is an ‘overgeneralisation to say that the use of the UN convention by the ECtHR 
is 'the best of both worlds’’ (2007: 23).   
International Standards in the English Courts 
The English courts adopt the approach of their Strasbourg colleagues and interpret ECHR rights 
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– given domestic legal effect by the HRA – using the CRC and associated soft law. But, within 
juvenile justice, as in other contexts, engagement with international children’s rights varies 
(Tobin, 2009).  In some cases, and for some judges, the CRC is invisible (no reference is 
madexii); in others it is marginal (it is referred to but forms no real part of the reasoning; it may 
be dismissed as not relevant or it is used merely to assert that domestic law is compatiblexiii); 
at times a superficial approach is adopted (the CRC features in the reasoning but the analysis 
is superficialxiv); but elsewhere, judges have adopted a ‘substantive approach’ (conceptualising 
issues, adopting procedures, interpreting content, or reasoning in a way compatible with 
children’s rights (Tobin, 2009)).xv  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to survey all of the 
English case law.  Instead, two cases are discussed to exemplify the ways in which the English 
courts have, and have not, used the CRC. 
 
R (HC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department is an exemplar of judicial engagement 
with international juvenile justice standards.  The case concerned the child-specific rights 
available when children are arrested, detained and questioned by the police (namely the right 
to an appropriate adult and parental notification of arrest) and which extended only to those 
aged 16 and under.  A claim was therefore brought by a 17 year-old boy that Article 8 and 
Article 6 ECHR, interpreted in line with the CRC (including the definition in Article 1 of a 
child as a person under 18), had been breached.  Interestingly, the Court did not base its decision 
on Article 6, as one might expect in a case concerning procedural rights of suspects, but on 
Article 8.  One reason for this was that it allowed the High Court to follow the precedent of the 
Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) and elevate the child’s best interests to a ‘primary 
consideration’ when determining whether a restriction of Article 8 was proportionate.  In 
assessing this, the Court held that since children (i.e 17 year-olds) were treated in the same way 
as adults, their best interests could not have been a primary consideration: hence, the decision 
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was unlawful.  The emphasis in HC on the child’s best interests, needs, vulnerabilities, and on 
his familial relationships as the source of his rights when in police detention conveys an 
important message about the way in which children in conflict with the law are socially – and 
legally – constructed, challenging the pervasive negative images of (putative) child offenders 
that, in England, have been dominant since the 1990s.  However, as I have noted elsewhere 
(Hollingsworth, 2014: 91), the specific content of children’s procedural rights in police 
detention was left legally undefined, and so the possibility remains that legislation could be 
passed that limits the child suspect’s rights but which, provided children are treated differently 
from adults, would nonetheless be compatible with the ostensibly ‘substantive’ children’s 
rights approach in HC.   
 
The second example, R (JC) v Central Criminal Court, examined the statutory provisions that 
restrict media reporting of Crown Court cases involving child defendants.  The legal framework 
is broadly compliant with international children’s rights normsxvi that privacy be fully respected 
at all stages of the proceedings (Article 40(2)(vii) UNCRC; Beijing Rules, Rule 8 xvii).  
However, in JC the Court of Appeal held that reporting restrictions expire upon the child’s 18th 
birthday, reasoning that the terms ‘child or young person’ used in the statute unambiguously 
fixed their temporal reach and that the purpose of the statute was to protect children not the 
adults they become.  Further, since this issue concerned the interests of adults (ie those 
convicted as a child but now over 18) the CRC was afforded little significance (para 31).  One 
thing this case illustrates is the need for a coherent normative and theoretical basis for the rights 
of children in conflict with the law, against which the scope and purpose of international 
standards, including the CRC, can be better articulated.  Elsewhere I have suggested that a 
rights-based youth justice system is one that is consistent with the child’s autonomy: not only 
her autonomy in the present (the child as ‘being’), but also her capacity for autonomy as a 
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future adult (the child as ‘becoming’), protected by a class of rights I call ‘foundational rights’ 
(Hollingsworth, 2013).  Foundational rights help to ensure that the child’s capacity for 
autonomy as an adult is not permanently harmed by her childhood offending.  Applied to the 
issue of reporting restrictions, it is clear that lifelong anonymity is not about protecting the 
rights of adults, but about protecting the child’s capacity for future autonomy.  The rights of 
the child as a future adult are not inseparable from her rights during childhood and as such, the 
CRC should apply, including (the rather weak) obligation towards children’s reintegration in 
Article 40(1).  It is this, as well as the child’s welfare and participation during trial, which 
underpins the child’s rights to privacy in criminal proceedings and which is secured by lifelong 
reporting restrictions. 
Concluding comments 
International children’s rights measures provide a detailed, comprehensive framework that can 
be, and have been, used to improve the treatment of children in conflict with the law in England.  
Despite the weaknesses in child-rights specific enforcement mechanisms, international 
standards have been used to secure systemic change as well as remedies for individual children 
when used in litigation as an interpretative aid for the ECHR. However, this is not a panacea.  
As the discussion above has shown, the ECHR cannot provide a vehicle for all international 
standards; at times the judiciary use the norms superficially; the lack of a clear normative basis 
can limit the scope of the rights in litigation, and the Government’s response is usually only 
just enough to secure compliance and shows little overall commitment to children’s rights.  The 
introduction of OP3 may also have the unintended consequence of causing a diminution in the 
child-specific jurisprudence of the ECtHR should children from OP3-ratifying European states 
take their complaints instead to the UN Committee.  This could have a detrimental effect on 
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English children whose Government is unlikely to ratify and who must, therefore, rely on the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence  as the source of their rights domestically and internationally. 
However, by far the greatest limitation of the ECHR as the vehicle for English children’s rights 
is the threat of repeal of the HRA, as proposed by the Conservative Party.  Should this happen, 
the ECHR will no longer be domestically enforceable, and the ‘hook’ for CRC rights will be 
lost.  The children’s Convention will not, however, lose all domestic application.  As with any 
international human rights treaty, the CRC can be used to interpret ambiguous legislation and 
to develop the common law.  However, the utility of the CRC in statutory interpretation is 
limited only to ambiguous legislation and, following a line of juvenile justice-related cases, 
only to legislation passed after UK ratification in 1991 (see again JC; and R (T) v Secretary of 
State for Justice).  The CRC cannot, therefore, be used to interpret the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1933 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, both of which contain 
provisions that are vital for children in conflict with the law.  The common law holds more 
promise and the courts have used the CRC to develop judicial review principles for example to 
require adult assistance for children in parole hearings (R (K) v Parole Board).  There are also 
indications that the judiciary are embedding rights in the common law rather than using the 
ECHR, in anticipation of HRA repeal (R (Osborn) v Parole Board).   But none of this is 
sufficient to provide a child-friendly criminal justice system, one that complies fully with 
international standards.  For that to occur, the starting point has to be domestic incorporation 
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 My thanks to Helen Stalford and Claire Sands for earlier comments. 
i Space precludes an examination of the European Union, but – provided the UK retains its membership – it 
provides an important source of rights for children (see eg Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union and Stalford, 2012), that in the criminal justice system are strengthened by the proposed 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on procedural safeguards for children suspected or 
accused in criminal proceedings (COM (2013) 822 final).   The directive draws on the UN standards discussed 
below (Stalford, 2015), and when implemented will oblige domestic compliance.  
ii Other relevant CoE treaties include the European Social Charter (for children’s socio-economic) rights 
(Kilkelly, 2015; see especially articles 7 and 17) and the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s 
Rights.  These have featured less as a source of rights for children in conflict with the law and thus, again, space 
precludes its full consideration.  
iii Namely, General Comments (especially General Comment No 10) and concluding observations. 
iv For example, 17 year-olds were removed from the adult system of remand ostensibly to comply with the UN 
Committee’s requirement (UN Committee, 2002) that there be a separate system of criminal justice for children 
(see Ministry of Justice, 2011) yet the same Government refused to extend to 17 year-olds in police detention 
the same rights enjoyed by all other children until it was forced to do so by a legal challenge (R (HC) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department; see further Hollingsworth, 2014). 
v For example, the drop in child custody figures since 2009 are as much due to changes in managerial practices 
in the police which have reduced first time entrants into the youth justice system as they are any commitment to 
children’s rights (Allen, 2011). 
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vi In HC (above n iv). 
vii See also Recommendations of the Council of Ministers on the European Rules for Juvenile Offenders Subject 
to Sanctions or Measures; and New Ways of Dealing with Juvenile Delinquency and the Role of Juvenile 
Justice. 
viii In V v United Kingdom (conjoined with T v United Kingdom), only the Article 6 claim (right to participate 
effectively in one’s trial) was successful.  
ix As well as the EU proposed directive, above n i. 
x See b 
elow n xvii. 
xi The guidelines have higher standards, for example, in relation to the requirement for specially trained lawyers: 
Rap, 2013. 
xii eg R (W) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (curfew powers). 
xiii eg D v Chief Constable of Merseyside (strip searching of a vulnerable 14 year old girl in the police station); R 
(Y) v Aylesbury Crown Court (reporting restrictions). 
xiv Eg R (SR) v Nottingham Magistrates Court (discrimination between boys and girls vis a vis remand).  
xv Eg R (R) v Durham Constabulary (diversion); R (C) v Secretary of State for Justice (restraint in secure 
accommodation); R (HC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (rights of 17 year-olds in police 
stations). 
xvi Courts have a duty to impose reporting restrictions in the youth court (which can be lifted in the public 
interest), and discretion to do so when children appear as defendants in the (adult) Crown Court (Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933 (CYPA), s 49 and Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCE), s 45 
respectively).   
xvii The guidelines on child friendly justice are weaker, and require only that: ‘The privacy and personal data of 
children who are or have been involved in judicial or non-judicial proceedings and other interventions should be 
protected in accordance with national law. This generally implies that no information or personal data may be 
made available or published, particularly in the media, which could reveal or indirectly enable the disclosure of 
the child’s identity . . .’. 
